Tag Archives: Epistemology

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, REFLECTION AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 187-199)

Julien BEILLARD ABSTRACT: Huemer defends phenomenal conservatism (PC) and also the further claim that belief in any rival theory is self-defeating (SD). Here I construct a dilemma for his position: either PC and SD are incompatible, or belief in PC is itself self-defeating. I take these considerations to suggest a better self-defeat argument for (belief in) PC and a strong form ... Read More »

DEFENDING THE UNIQUENESS THESIS: A REPLY TO LUIS ROSA (pages 129-139)

Muralidharan ANANTHARAMAN ABSTRACT: The Uniqueness Thesis (U), according to Richard Feldman and Roger White, says that for a given set of evidence E and a proposition P, only one doxastic attitude about P is rational given E. Luis Rosa has recently provided two counterexamples against U which are supposed to show that even if there is a sense in which choosing ... Read More »

EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND BELIEF (pages 275-301)

Michael Shaw PERRY ABSTRACT: In this paper I analyze epistemological externalism and its adequacy as a response to skepticism. Externalism is defined by denial of accessibility: a subject can know if a particular condition beyond truth and belief is satisfied, even if the subject has no reflective access to the satisfaction of the condition. It hence has quick responses to skepticism. ... Read More »

MAXWELLIAN SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION: A CASE STUDY IN KANTIAN EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 183–207)

Rinat M. NUGAYEV ABSTRACT: It is exhibited that maxwellian electrodynamics was created as a result of the old pre-maxwellian programmes reconciliation: the electrodynamics of Ampere-Weber, the wave theory of Young-Fresnel and Faraday’s programme. The programmes’ meeting led to construction of the whole hierarchy of theoretical objects starting from the genuine crossbreeds (the displacement current) and up to usual mongrels. After the ... Read More »

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY (pages 33–62)

B.J.C. Madison ABSTRACT: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject ... Read More »

TOUCHSTONES OF HISTORY: ANSCOMBE, HUME, AND JULIUS CAESAR

Catherine Z. ELGIN ABSTRACT: In “Hume and Julius Caesar,” G.E.M. Anscombe argues that some historical claims, such as “Julius Caesar was assassinated,” serve as touchstones for historical knowledge. Only Cartesian doubt can call them into question. I examine her reasons for thinking that the discipline of history must be grounded in claims that it is powerless to discredit. I argue that ... Read More »

BELIEF IN NATURALISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGIST’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Susan HAACK ABSTRACT: The present study reiterates one of the main ideas that we exposed in 1983, in the paper “Din fals rezultă orice” (“From False Follows Anything”), published in the volume Întemeieri raţionale în filosofia ştiinţei (Rational Foundations in the Philosophy of Science) when we referred to the notion of semi-truth, as a third alethic value, placed between „truth” and ... Read More »

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