Volume IX, Issue 3, 2018

Volume IX, Issue 3, 2018

CAN I KNOW THAT ANYTHING EXISTS UNPERCEIVED? (pages 245-260)

Aaran BURNS ABSTRACT: It is well known that G.E Moore brought about a revival of Realism with his classic “The Refutation of Idealism.” Three decades later W.T. Stace wrote an unfortunately less famous paper, “The Refutation of Realism.” In that paper, Stace claims that “we do not know that a single entity exists unperceived.” This paper provides an interpretation of Stace’s ... Read More »

THE SEEMING ACCOUNT OF SELF-EVIDENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO AUDIAN ACCOUNT (pages 261-284)

Hossein DABBAGH ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, ... Read More »

AGAINST BOGHOSSIAN’S CASE FOR INCOMPATIBILISM (pages 285-306)

Simon DIERIG ABSTRACT: Two major objections have been raised to Boghossian’s discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Proponents of the first objection claim that thoughts about “twin water” are not relevant alternatives to thoughts about water. Advocates of the second objection argue that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is not required for knowledge. Even though it ... Read More »

E = K AND NON-EPISTEMIC PERCEPTION (pages 307-331)

Frank HOFMANN ABSTRACT: Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one ... Read More »

NO EPISTEMIC TROUBLE FOR ENGINEERING ‘WOMAN:’ RESPONSE TO SIMION (pages 335-341)

Robin McKENNA ABSTRACT: In a recent article in this journal, Mona Simion argues that Sally Haslanger’s “engineering” approach to gender concepts such as ‘woman’ faces an epistemic objection. The primary function of all concepts—gender concepts included—is to represent the world, but Haslanger’s engineering account of ‘woman’ fails to adequately represent the world because, by her own admission, it doesn’t include all ... Read More »

SOSA’S SAFETY NEEDS SUPPLEMENTING, NOT SAVING: A REPLY TO COMESAÑA AND MCBRIDE (pages 343-351)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: Juan Comesaña argues that Halloween Party shows that Sosa’s (2002) disjunctive safety condition on knowledge is too strong. Mark McBride agrees, and proposes a modification to that condition in order to evade Halloween Party. I show that that Halloween Party is not a counterexample to Sosa’s disjunctive safety condition. However the condition, as well as McBride’s modification ... Read More »

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