Discussion Notes/Debate2

Discussion Notes/Debate, VII, 2

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, REFLECTION AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 187-199)

Julien BEILLARD ABSTRACT: Huemer defends phenomenal conservatism (PC) and also the further claim that belief in any rival theory is self-defeating (SD). Here I construct a dilemma for his position: either PC and SD are incompatible, or belief in PC is itself self-defeating. I take these considerations to suggest a better self-defeat argument for (belief in) PC and a strong form ... Read More »

EXPLANATIONISM, SUPER-EXPLANATIONISM, ECCLECTIC EXPLANATIONISM: PERSISTENT PROBLEMS ON BOTH SIDES (pages 201-213)

T. Ryan BYERLY, Kraig MARTIN ABSTRACT: We argue that explanationist views in epistemology continue to face persistent challenges to both their necessity and their sufficiency. This is so despite arguments offered by Kevin McCain in a paper recently published in this journal which attempt to show otherwise. We highlight ways in which McCain’s attempted solutions to problems we had previously raised ... Read More »

SUPPOSITIONAL REASONING AND PERCEPTUAL JUSTIFICATION (pages 215-219)

Stewart COHEN ABSTRACT: James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result. Download PDF Read More »

REPLY TO ADAMS AND CLARKE (pages 221-225)

Tristan HAZE ABSTRACT: Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick’s method-relativized ... Read More »

SCHROEDER AND WHITING ON KNOWLEDGE AND DEFEAT (pages 231-238)

 Javier GONZÁLEZ DE PRADO SALAS ABSTRACT: Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to ... Read More »

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