RESEARCH ARTICLES IX 3

RESEARCH ARTICLES IX 3

CAN I KNOW THAT ANYTHING EXISTS UNPERCEIVED? (pages 245-260)

Aaran BURNS ABSTRACT: It is well known that G.E Moore brought about a revival of Realism with his classic “The Refutation of Idealism.” Three decades later W.T. Stace wrote an unfortunately less famous paper, “The Refutation of Realism.” In that paper, Stace claims that “we do not know that a single entity exists unperceived.” This paper provides an interpretation of Stace’s …

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THE SEEMING ACCOUNT OF SELF-EVIDENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO AUDIAN ACCOUNT (pages 261-284)

Hossein DABBAGH ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue against the epistemology of some contemporary moral intuitionists who believe that the notion of self-evidence is more important than that of intuition. Quite the contrary, I think the notion of intuition is more basic if intuitions are construed as intellectual seemings. First, I will start with elaborating Robert Audi’s account of self-evidence. Next, …

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AGAINST BOGHOSSIAN’S CASE FOR INCOMPATIBILISM (pages 285-306)

Simon DIERIG ABSTRACT: Two major objections have been raised to Boghossian’s discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Proponents of the first objection claim that thoughts about “twin water” are not relevant alternatives to thoughts about water. Advocates of the second objection argue that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is not required for knowledge. Even though it …

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E = K AND NON-EPISTEMIC PERCEPTION (pages 307-331)

Frank HOFMANN ABSTRACT: Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one …

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