Tag Archives: testimony

TESTIMONIAL INSULT: A MORAL REASON FOR BELIEF? (pages 27-48)

Finlay MALCOLM ABSTRACT: When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to ... Read More »

INTERNALISM, EVIDENTIALISM AND APPEALS TO EXPERT KNOWLEDGE (pages 291-305)

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: Given the sheer vastness of the totality of contemporary human knowledge and our individual epistemic finitude it is commonplace for those of us who lack knowledge with respect to some proposition(s) to appeal to experts (those who do have knowledge with respect to that proposition(s)) as an epistemic resource. Of course, much ink has been spilled ... Read More »

A HUMEAN ACCOUNT OF TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION (pages 209–219)

Shane RYAN ABSTRACT: I argue that a Humean account can make sense of the phenomenology associated with testimonial justification; the phenomenology being that in standard cases hearers regularly simply accept a testifier’s assertions as true – hearers don’t engage in monitoring. The upshot is that a Humean account is in a better position dialectically than is usually supposed. I provide some background ... Read More »

VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, TESTIMONY, AND TRUST (pages 95–102)

Benjamin W. McCRAW ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that Sknows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the ... Read More »

ASSERTION, TESTIMONY, AND THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF SPEECH

Sanford GOLDBERG ABSTRACT: Whether or not all assertion counts as testimony (a matter not addressed here), it is argued that not all testimony involves assertion. Since many views in the epistemology of testimony assume that testimony requires assertion, such views are (at best) insufficiently general. This result also points to what we might call the epistemic significance of assertion as such. ... Read More »

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