Volume VI, Issue 1, 2015

DISAGREEMENT AND PHILOSOPHICAL PROGRESS (pages 115-127)

Brent ABLES ABSTRACT: In “Belief in the Face of Controversy,” Hilary Kornblith argues for a radical form of epistemic modesty: given that there has been no demonstrable cumulative progress in the history of philosophy – as there has been in formal logic, math, and science – Kornblith concludes that philosophers do not have the epistemic credibility to be trusted as authorities …

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DEFENDING THE UNIQUENESS THESIS: A REPLY TO LUIS ROSA (pages 129-139)

Muralidharan ANANTHARAMAN ABSTRACT: The Uniqueness Thesis (U), according to Richard Feldman and Roger White, says that for a given set of evidence E and a proposition P, only one doxastic attitude about P is rational given E. Luis Rosa has recently provided two counterexamples against U which are supposed to show that even if there is a sense in which choosing …

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DIFFERENCE-MAKING AND EASY KNOWLEDGE: REPLY TO COMESAÑA AND SARTORIO (pages 141-146)

Erik J. WIELENBERG ABSTRACT: Juan Comesaña and Carolina Sartorio have recently proposed a diagnosis of what goes wrong in apparently illegitimate cases of ‘bootstrapping’ one’s way to excessively easy knowledge. They argue that in such cases the bootstrapper bases at least one of her beliefs on evidence that does not evidentially support the proposition believed. I explicate the principle that underlies …

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A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BONJOUR’S, HAACK’S, AND DANCY’S THEORY OF EMPIRICAL JUSTIFICATION (pages 7-34)

Dionysis CHRISTIAS ABSTRACT: A In this paper, we shall describe and critically evaluate four contemporary theories which attempt to solve the problem of the infinite regress of reasons: BonJour’s ‘impure’ coherentism, BonJour’s foundationalism, Haack’s ‘foundherentism’ and Dancy’s pure coherentism. These theories are initially put forward as theories about the justification of our empirical beliefs; however, in fact they also attempt to provide …

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DEFENDING STANDARDS CONTEXTUALISM (pages 35-59)

Robert HUDSON ABSTRACT: A It has become more common recently for epistemologists to advocate the pragmatic encroachment on knowledge, the claim that the appropriateness of knowledge ascriptions is dependent on the relevant practical circumstances. Advocacy of practicalism in epistemology has come at the expense of contextualism, the view that knowledge ascriptions are independent of pragmatic factors and depend alternatively on distinctively epistemological, semantic factors with the result …

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INTERVENTIONISM DEFENDED (pages 61-73)

Kevin McCAIN ABSTRACT: James Woodward’s Making Things Happen presents the most fully developed version of a manipulability theory of causation. Although the ‘interventionist’ account of causation that Woodward defends in Making Things Happen has many admirable qualities, Michael Strevens argues that it has a fatal flaw. Strevens maintains that Woodward’s interventionist account of causation renders facts about causation relative to an …

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ON THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF MODAL RATIONALISM: THE MAIN PROBLEMS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE (pages 75-94)

Mihai RUSU ABSTRACT: In this paper, I discuss the main characteristics of the epistemology of modal rationalism by proceeding from the critical investigation of Peacocke’s theory of modality. I build on arguments by Crispin Wright and Sonia Roca-Royes, which are generalised and supplemented by further analysis, in order to show that principle-based accounts have little prospects of succeeding in their task …

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A DAVIDSONIAN RESPONSE TO RADICAL SCEPTICISM (pages 95-111)

Ju WANG ABSTRACT: In this paper, I attempt to show how Davidson’s anti-sceptical argument can respond to the closureRK-based radical scepticism. My approach will focus on the closureRK principle rather than the possibility that our beliefs could be massively wrong. I first review Davidson’s principle of charity and the triangulation argument, and then I extract his theory on content of a belief. …

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