Tag Archives: assertion

A NON-PUZZLE ABOUT ASSERTION AND TRUTH (pages 475-479)

John TURRI ABSTRACT: It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) …

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REPLY TO FORRAI: NO REPRIEVE FOR GETTIER “BELIEFS” (pages 327-331)

John BIRO ABSTRACT: In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone’s reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as …

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REPLY TO SIMION (pages 113-116)

Jonathan L. Kvanvig ABSTRACT: Mona Simion questions whether there is a distinction between taking back an assertion and taking back only the content of an assertion, as I have claimed. After arguing against the distinction in question, Simion grants that there is a difference between the cases that I use to illustrate the distinction, and thus turns to the task of explaining …

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KNOWLEDGE, ASSERTION AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY (pages 489-502)

J. Adam CARTER and Emma C. GORDON ABSTRACT: This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that …

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ASSERTION: JUST ONE WAY TO TAKE IT BACK (pages 385-391)

Mona SIMION ABSTRACT: According to Jonathan Kvanvig, the practice of taking back one’s assertion when finding out that one has been mistaken or gettiered fails to speak in favour of a knowledge norm of assertion. To support this claim, he introduces a distinction between taking back the content of the assertion, and taking back the speech act itself. This paper argues …

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