Volume X, Issue 2, 2019

Volume X, Issue 2, 2019

THERE ARE ACTUAL BRAINS IN VATS NOW (pages 135-145)

Adam Michael Bricker ABSTRACT: There are brains in vats (BIVs) in the actual world. These “cerebral organoids” are roughly comparable to the brains of three-month-old foetuses, and conscious cerebral organoids seem only a matter of time. Philosophical interest in conscious cerebral organoids has thus far been limited to bioethics, and the purpose of this paper is to discuss cerebral organoids ... Read More »

PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT AND CONTEXT EXTERNALISM (pages 165-174)

David COSS ABSTRACT: Pragmatic Encroachment (PE hereafter), sometimes called ‘anti-intellectualism,’ is a denial of epistemic purism. Purism is the view that only traditional, truth-relevant, epistemic factors determine whether a true belief is an instance of knowledge. According to anti-intellectualists, two subjects S and S*, could be in the same epistemic position with regards to puristic epistemic factors, but S might ... Read More »

EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING: THE DEMARCATION PROBLEM (pages 175-182)

Christos KYRIACOU ABSTRACT: Recent literature has paid considerable attention to evolutionary debunking arguments. But the cogency of evolutionary debunking arguments is compromised by a problem for such arguments that has been somewhat overlooked, namely, what we may call ‘the demarcation problem.’ This is the problem of asking in virtue of what regulative metaepistemic norm evolutionary considerations either render a belief ... Read More »

IS EPISTEMIC BLAME DISTINCT FROM MORAL BLAME? (pages 183-194)

Daniella MEEHAN ABSTRACT: In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as ‘epistemic blame skepticism,’ seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion ... Read More »

KNOWING HOW ONE KNOWS (pages 195-205)

Giovanni Rolla ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that knowledge is dimly luminous. That is: if a person knows that p, she knows how she knows that p. The argument depends on a safety-based account of propositional knowledge, which is salient in Williamson’s critique of the ‘KK’ principle. I combine that account with non-intellectualism about knowledge-how – according to which, ... Read More »

QUINE AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE INDISPENSABILITY ARGUMENT (pages 207-213)

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction¾when coupled with some other plausible and related views¾implies that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical theories within the Quinean framework.  This is a serious problem because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot ... Read More »

GETTIERED BELIEFS ARE GENUINE BELIEFS: A REPLY TO GAULTIER AND BIRO (pages 217-224)

Gábor FORRAI ABSTRACT: In recent articles in this journal Benoit Gaultier and John Biro have argued that the original Gettier cases and the ones closely modelled on them fail, and the reason for the failure is that the subject in these cases does not actually have the belief that would serve as a counterexample to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge. ... Read More »

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