Tag Archives: evidence

‘PEER DISAGREEMENT’ AND EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE (pages 379-402)

John BIRO, Fabio LAMPERT ABSTRACT: What the rational thing to do in the face of disagreement by an epistemic peer is has been much discussed recently. Those who think that a peer’s disagreement is itself evidence against one’s belief, as many do, are committed to a special form of epistemic dependence. If such disagreement is really evidence, it seems reasonable to ... Read More »

SCIENCE, VALUES, AND THE PRIORITY OF EVIDENCE (pages 413-431)

P.D. MAGNUS ABSTRACT: It is now commonly held that values play a role in scientific judgment, but many arguments for that conclusion are limited. First, many arguments do not show that values are, strictly speaking, indispensable. The role of values could in principle be filled by a random or arbitrary decision. Second, many arguments concern scientific theories and concepts which ... Read More »

E = K AND NON-EPISTEMIC PERCEPTION (pages 307-331)

Frank HOFMANN ABSTRACT: Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one ... Read More »

WHAT IS EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE EVIDENCE OF? (pages 195-206)

Fabio LAMPERT and John BIRO ABSTRACT: Richard Feldman’s well-known principle about disagreement and evidence – usually encapsulated in the slogan, ‘evidence of evidence is evidence,’ (EEE) – invites the question, what should a rational believer do when faced by such evidence, especially when the disagreement is with an epistemic peer? The question has been the subject of much controversy. However, ... Read More »

IS THERE ROOM FOR JUSTIFIED BELIEFS WITHOUT EVIDENCE? A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF EPISTEMIC EVIDENTIALISM (pages 137-152)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be ... Read More »

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

Benoit GAULTIER ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued ... Read More »

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