Tag Archives: justification

A NEW RESPONSE TO THE NEW EVIL DEMON PROBLEM (pages 41-45)

Umut BAYSAN ABSTRACT: The New Evil Demon Problem is meant to show that reliabilism about epistemic justification is incompatible with the intuitive idea that the external-world beliefs of a subject who is the victim of a Cartesian demon could be epistemically justified. Here, I present a new argument that such beliefs can be justified on reliabilism. Whereas others have argued for ... Read More »

INFERENCES, EXPERIENCES, AND THE MYTH OF THE GIVEN: A REPLY TO CHAMPAGNE (pages 155-162)

Thomas Wilk ABSTRACT: In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed ‘the Myth of the Given.’ Champagne contends that what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both cause and justify propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show that one ... Read More »

EXPLANATIONISM: DEFENDED ON ALL SIDES (pages 333-349)

Kevin McCAIN ABSTRACT: Explanationists about epistemic justification hold that justification depends upon explanatory considerations. After a bit of a lull, there has recently been a resurgence of defenses of such views. Despite the plausibility of these defenses, explanationism still faces challenges. Recently, T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin have argued that explanationist views fail to provide either necessary or sufficient conditions ... Read More »

COHERENTISM AND BELIEF FIXATION (pages 187–199)

Erik KRAG ABSTRACT: Plantinga argues that cases involving ‘fixed’ beliefs refute the coherentist thesis that a belief’s belonging to a coherent set of beliefs suffices for its having justification (warrant). According to Plantinga, a belief cannot be justified if there is a ‘lack of fit’ between it and its subject’s experiences. I defend coherentism by showing that if Plantinga means to ... Read More »

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM AND SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO HUEMER (pages 343-350)

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, ... Read More »

EPISTEMIC DEONTOLOGISM AND ROLE-OUGHTS (pages 245-263)

Jon ALTSCHUL ABSTRACT: William Alston’s argument against epistemological deontologism rests upon two key premises: first, that we lack a suitable amount of voluntary control with respect to our beliefs, and, second, the principle that “ought” implies “can.” While several responses to Alston have concerned rejecting either of these two premises, I argue that even on the assumption that both premises are ... Read More »

EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY (pages 33–62)

B.J.C. Madison ABSTRACT: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject ... Read More »

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 103–110)

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then ... Read More »

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