Tag Archives: reasons

EVERYTHING IS SELF-EVIDENT (pages 413-426)

Steven DIGGIN ABSTRACT: Plausible probabilistic accounts of evidential support entail that every true proposition is evidence for itself. This paper defends this surprising principle against a series of recent objections from Jessica Brown. Specifically, the paper argues that: (i) explanationist accounts of evidential support convergently entail that every true proposition is self-evident, and (ii) it is often felicitous to cite …

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MENO’S PARADOX IS AN EPISTEMIC REGRESS PROBLEM (pages 107-120)

Andrew CLING ABSTRACT: I give an interpretation according to which Meno’s paradox is an epistemic regress problem. The paradox is an argument for skepticism assuming that (1) acquired knowledge about an object X requires prior knowledge about what X is and (2) any knowledge must be acquired. (1) is a principle about having reasons for knowledge and about the epistemic …

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TESTIMONIAL INSULT: A MORAL REASON FOR BELIEF? (pages 27-48)

Finlay MALCOLM ABSTRACT: When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to …

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SCHROEDER AND WHITING ON KNOWLEDGE AND DEFEAT (pages 231-238)

 Javier GONZÁLEZ DE PRADO SALAS ABSTRACT: Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to …

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TRANSPARENCY AND REASONS FOR BELIEF (pages 475-494)

Benjamin WALD ABSTRACT: Belief has a special connection to truth, a connection not shared by mental states like imagination. One way of capturing this connection is by the claim that belief aims at truth. Normativists argue that we should understand this claim as a normative claim about belief – beliefs ought to be true. A second important connection between belief and …

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