Tag Archives: virtue epistemology

COLLECTIVE EPISTEMIC TRAITS AS SYSTEM PROPERTIES (pages 387-408)

Mark Anthony L. DACELA, Napoleon M. MABAQUIAO, Jr. ABSTRACT: The essay deals with the issue of how a non-summativist account of collective epistemic traits can be properly justified. We trace the roots of this issue in virtue epistemology and collective epistemology and then critically examine certain views advanced to justify non-summativism. We focus on those considered by Fricker, including Gilbert’s …

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Alston, Aristotle, and Epistemic Normativity (pages 75-92)

Benjamin W. McCRAW ABSTRACT: Alston (2005) argues that there is no such thing as a single concept of epistemic justification. Instead, there is an irreducible plurality of epistemically valuable features of beliefs: ‘epistemic desiderata.’ I argue that this approach is problematic for meta-epistemological reasons. How, for instance, do we characterize epistemic evaluation and do we do we go about it …

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PHILOSOPHICAL SITUATIONISM AND THE VICIOUS MINDS HYPOTHESIS (pages 7-39)

Guy AXTELL ABSTRACT: This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue …

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CARTESIAN HUMILITY AND PYRRHONIAN PASSIVITY: THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EPISTEMIC AGENCY (pages 461-487)

Modesto GÓMEZ-ALONSO ABSTRACT: While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in …

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TEACHING VIRTUE: CHANGING ATTITUDES (pages 503-527)

Alessandra TANESINI ABSTRACT: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution about the efficacy of direct instruction …

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HUMILITY, LISTENING AND ‘TEACHING IN A STRONG SENSE’ (pages 529-554)

Andrea R. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: My argument in this paper is that humility is implied in the concept of teaching, if teaching is construed in a strong sense. Teaching in a strong sense is a view of teaching as linked to students’ embodied experiences (including cognitive and moral-social dimensions), in particular students’ experiences of limitation, whereas a weak sense of teaching refers …

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A DISPOSITIONAL INTERNALIST EVIDENTIALIST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 399-424)

T. Ryan BYERLY ABSTRACT: This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidential support. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential …

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AGAINST KORNBLITH AGAINST REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (pages 351-360)

Timothy PERRINE ABSTRACT: In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges. Download PDF

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RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)

James FILLER ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new …

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VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, TESTIMONY, AND TRUST (pages 95–102)

Benjamin W. McCRAW ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that Sknows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the …

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