Tag Archives: truth

Radical Knowledge Minimalism (pages 223-227)

Jeremy FANTL, Matthew McGRATH ABSTRACT: We argue that knowledge doesn’t require any of truth, justification, or belief. This is so for four primary reasons. First, each of the three conditions has been subject to convincing counterexamples. In addition, the resultant account explains the value of knowledge, manifests important theoretical virtues (in particular, simplicity), and avoids commitment to skepticism. Download PDF

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TRUE KNOWLEDGE (pages 455-461)

Peter BAUMANN ABSTRACT: That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. …

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A NON-PUZZLE ABOUT ASSERTION AND TRUTH (pages 475-479)

John TURRI ABSTRACT: It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) …

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SURREALISM IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO SCIENTIFIC REALISM (pages 379-393)

Seungbae PARK ABSTRACT: Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is …

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LIMITATIONS AND THE WORLD BEYOND (pages 425-454)

Patrick GRIM and Nicholas RESCHER ABSTRACT: This paper surveys our inescapable limits as cognitive agents with regard to a full world of fact: the well-known metamathematical limits of axiomatic systems, limitations of explanation that doom a principle of sufficient reason, limitations of expression across all possible languages, and a simple but powerful argument regarding the limits of conceivability. In ways …

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ANOTHER DEFENCE OF OWENS’S EXCLUSIVITY OBJECTION TO BELIEFS HAVING AIMS (pages 147-153)

SULLIVAN-BISSETT and Paul NOORDHOF ABSTRACT: David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded …

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RECOGNIZING ‘TRUTH’ IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (pages 273-286)

Lajos BRONS ABSTRACT: The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize ‘truth’ in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of truth, the concept of TRUTH, and the word ·truth·. The …

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TRANSPARENCY AND REASONS FOR BELIEF (pages 475-494)

Benjamin WALD ABSTRACT: Belief has a special connection to truth, a connection not shared by mental states like imagination. One way of capturing this connection is by the claim that belief aims at truth. Normativists argue that we should understand this claim as a normative claim about belief – beliefs ought to be true. A second important connection between belief and …

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