Tag Archives: belief

NON-PICKWICKIAN BELIEF AND ‘THE GETTIER PROBLEM’ (pages 47-69)

John BIRO ABSTRACT: That in Gettier’s alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier’s protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If ... Read More »

WEIGHING THE AIM OF BELIEF AGAIN (pages 141-145)

Asbjørn STEGLICH-PETERSEN ABSTRACT: In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable against other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out ... Read More »

ANOTHER DEFENCE OF OWENS’S EXCLUSIVITY OBJECTION TO BELIEFS HAVING AIMS (pages 147-153)

SULLIVAN-BISSETT and Paul NOORDHOF ABSTRACT: David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded ... Read More »

BEING SURE AND BEING CONFIDENT THAT YOU WON’T LOSE CONFIDENCE (pages 45-54)

Alexander R. PRUSS ABSTRACT: There is an important sense in which one can be sure without being certain, i.e., without assigning unit probability. I will offer an explication of this sense of sureness, connecting it with the level of credence that a rational agent would need to have to be confident that she won’t ever lose her confidence. A simple formal ... Read More »

ON THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL DOXASTIC ATTITUDES (pages 425-443)

Tjerk GAUDERIS ABSTRACT: In the literature on doxastic attitudes, the notion ‘belief’ is used in both a coarse-grained and a fine-grained manner. While the coarse-grained notion of ‘belief,’ as the doxastic attitude that expresses any form of assent to its content, is a useful technical concept, the fine-grained notion, which tries to capture the folk notion of ‘belief’ in contrast with ... Read More »

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

Benoit GAULTIER ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued ... Read More »

RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)

James FILLER ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new ... Read More »

BELIEF IN NATURALISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGIST’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Susan HAACK ABSTRACT: The present study reiterates one of the main ideas that we exposed in 1983, in the paper “Din fals rezultă orice” (“From False Follows Anything”), published in the volume Întemeieri raţionale în filosofia ştiinţei (Rational Foundations in the Philosophy of Science) when we referred to the notion of semi-truth, as a third alethic value, placed between „truth” and ... Read More »

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