Tag Archives: externalism

THE SUBJECT’S PERSPECTIVE OBJECTION TO EXTERNALISM AND WHY IT FAILS (pages 323-331)

Perry HENDRICKS ABSTRACT: The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is an objection against externalist theories of justification, warrant, and knowledge. In this article, I show that externalists can accommodate the SPO while remaining externalist. So, even if the SPO is successful, it does not motivate internalism, and the primary motivation for internalism has been lost. After this, I provide an explanation ... Read More »

TRUTH TRACKING AND KNOWLEDGE FROM VIRTUAL REALITY (pages 369-388)

Billy WHEELER ABSTRACT: Is it possible to gain knowledge about the real world based solely on experiences in virtual reality? According to one influential theory of knowledge, you cannot. Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking theory requires that, in addition to a belief being true, it must also be sensitive to the truth. Yet beliefs formed in virtual reality are not sensitive: in ... Read More »

AGAINST BOGHOSSIAN’S CASE FOR INCOMPATIBILISM (pages 285-306)

Simon DIERIG ABSTRACT: Two major objections have been raised to Boghossian’s discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Proponents of the first objection claim that thoughts about “twin water” are not relevant alternatives to thoughts about water. Advocates of the second objection argue that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is not required for knowledge. Even though it ... Read More »

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, REFLECTION AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 187-199)

Julien BEILLARD ABSTRACT: Huemer defends phenomenal conservatism (PC) and also the further claim that belief in any rival theory is self-defeating (SD). Here I construct a dilemma for his position: either PC and SD are incompatible, or belief in PC is itself self-defeating. I take these considerations to suggest a better self-defeat argument for (belief in) PC and a strong form ... Read More »

INFERENTIAL, COHERENTIAL, AND FOUNDATIONAL WARRANT: AN ECLECTIC ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF WARRANT (pages 377-398)

Mark J. BOONE ABSTRACT: A warranted belief may derive inferential warrant from warranted beliefs which support it. It may possess what I call coherential warrant in virtue of being consistent with, or lacking improbability relative to, a large system of warranted beliefs. Finally, it may have foundational warrant, which does not derive from other beliefs at all. I define and distinguish ... Read More »

EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND BELIEF (pages 275-301)

Michael Shaw PERRY ABSTRACT: In this paper I analyze epistemological externalism and its adequacy as a response to skepticism. Externalism is defined by denial of accessibility: a subject can know if a particular condition beyond truth and belief is satisfied, even if the subject has no reflective access to the satisfaction of the condition. It hence has quick responses to skepticism. ... Read More »

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