Tag Archives: sensitive belief

STILL STUCK ON THE BACKWARD CLOCK: A REJOINDER TO CLARKE, ADAMS AND BARKER (pages 243-269)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. In their latest defence of the truth-tracking theories, “Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock,” Murray Clarke, Fred Adams and John A. Barker try again to defend Nozick’s and Fred Dretske’s early analysis of propositional knowledge against Backward Clock. …

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BEAT THE (BACKWARD) CLOCK (pages 353-361)

Fred ADAMS, John A. BARKER, Murray CLARKE ABSTRACT: In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke.  In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are …

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THERE’S NOTHING TO BEAT A BACKWARD CLOCK: A REJOINDER TO ADAMS, BARKER AND CLARKE (pages 363-378)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. Fred Adams, John Barker and Murray Clarke argue that Backward Clock is no such counterexample. Their argument fails to nullify Backward Clock which also shows that other tracking analyses, such as Dretske’s and one that Adams et al. may …

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