Volume XI, Issue 2, 2020

Volume XI, Issue 2, 2020

SCEPTICISM WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE-ATTRIBUTIONS (pages 133-148)

Aaran BURNS ABSTRACT: The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren’t looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and ... Read More »

NUMBERS, EMPIRICISM AND THE A PRIORI (pages 149-177)

Olga RAMÍREZ CALLE ABSTRACT: The present paper deals with the ontological status of numbers and considers Frege´s proposal in Grundlagen upon the background of the Post-Kantian semantic turn in analytical philosophy. Through a more systematic study of his philosophical premises, it comes to unearth a first level paradox that would unset earlier still than it was exposed by Russell. It ... Read More »

CASULLO ON EXPERIENTIAL JUSTIFICATION (pages 179-194)

R.M. FARLEY ABSTRACT: In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential ... Read More »

JUSTIFIED BY THOUGHT ALONE (pages 195-208)

Andrei MĂRĂŞOIU ABSTRACT: The new rationalists – BonJour and Bealer – have characterized one type of a priori justification as based on intellectual intuitions or seemings. I argue that they are mistaken in thinking that intellectual intuitions can provide a priori justification. Suppose that the proposition that a surface cannot be red and green all over strikes you as true. ... Read More »

THE APORIA OF OMNISCIENCE (pages 209-227)

Daniel RÖNNEDAL ABSTRACT: This paper introduces a new aporia, the aporia of omniscience. The puzzle consists of three propositions: (1) It is possible that there is someone who is necessarily omniscient and infallible, (2) It is necessary that all beliefs are historically settled, and (3) It is possible that the future is open. Every sentence in this set is intuitively ... Read More »

PROCESS RELIABILISM, PRIME NUMBERS AND THE GENERALITY PROBLEM (pages 231-236)

Frederik J. ANDERSEN, Klemens KAPPEL ABSTRACT: This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from ... Read More »

KNOWLEDGE, CERTAINTY, AND FACTIVITY: A POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT

Jeffrey HOOPS ABSTRACT: In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between ... Read More »

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