Volume V, Issue 3, 2014

Volume V, Issue 3, 2014

AGAINST KORNBLITH AGAINST REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (pages 351-360)

Timothy PERRINE ABSTRACT: In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges. Download PDF Read More »

PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM AND SELF-DEFEAT ARGUMENTS: A REPLY TO HUEMER (pages 343-350)

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to Michael Huemer’s reply to my objection against Phenomenal Conservatism (PC). I have argued that Huemer’s Self-defeat Argument for PC does not favor PC over competing theories of basic propositional justification, since analogous self-defeat arguments can be constructed for competing theories. Huemer responds that such analogous self-defeat arguments are unsound. In this paper, ... Read More »

WHAT IS THE PERMISSIBILITY SOLUTION A SOLUTION OF? – A QUESTION FOR KROEDEL (pages 333-342)

Franz HUBER ABSTRACT: Kroedel has proposed a new solution, the permissibility solution, to the lottery paradox. The lottery paradox results from the Lockean thesis according to which one ought to believe a proposition just in case one’s degree of belief in it is sufficiently high. The permissibility solution replaces the Lockean thesis by the permissibility thesis according to which one is ... Read More »

KK AND THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF ACTION (pages 321-331)

Michael DA SILVA ABSTRACT: This piece examines the purported explanatory and normative role of knowledge in Timothy Williamson’s account of intentional action and suggests that it is in tension with his argument against the luminosity of knowledge. Only iterable knowledge can serve as the norm for action capable of explaining both why people with knowledge act differently than those with mere ... Read More »

LOGIQUE QUANTIQUE ET INTRICATION (pages 303-318)

Pierre UZAN ABSTRACT: Due to the failure of the classical principles of bivalence and verifunctionality, the logic of experimental propositions relative to quantum systems cannot be interpreted in Boolean algebras. However, we cannot say neither that this logic is captured by orthomodular lattices, as claimed by many authors along the line of Birkhoff’s and von Neumann’s standard approach. For the alleged ... Read More »

EXTERNALISM, SKEPTICISM, AND BELIEF (pages 275-301)

Michael Shaw PERRY ABSTRACT: In this paper I analyze epistemological externalism and its adequacy as a response to skepticism. Externalism is defined by denial of accessibility: a subject can know if a particular condition beyond truth and belief is satisfied, even if the subject has no reflective access to the satisfaction of the condition. It hence has quick responses to skepticism. ... Read More »

AN ARGUMENT AGAINST THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTIERED BELIEFS (pages 265-272)

Benoit GAULTIER ABSTRACT: In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued ... Read More »

EPISTEMIC DEONTOLOGISM AND ROLE-OUGHTS (pages 245-263)

Jon ALTSCHUL ABSTRACT: William Alston’s argument against epistemological deontologism rests upon two key premises: first, that we lack a suitable amount of voluntary control with respect to our beliefs, and, second, the principle that “ought” implies “can.” While several responses to Alston have concerned rejecting either of these two premises, I argue that even on the assumption that both premises are ... Read More »

Optimizare SEO Carucioare copii Carucioare 3 in 1