Tag Archives: knowledge

CAN I KNOW THAT ANYTHING EXISTS UNPERCEIVED? (pages 245-260)

Aaran BURNS ABSTRACT: It is well known that G.E Moore brought about a revival of Realism with his classic “The Refutation of Idealism.” Three decades later W.T. Stace wrote an unfortunately less famous paper, “The Refutation of Realism.” In that paper, Stace claims that “we do not know that a single entity exists unperceived.” This paper provides an interpretation of Stace’s ... Read More »

E = K AND NON-EPISTEMIC PERCEPTION (pages 307-331)

Frank HOFMANN ABSTRACT: Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one ... Read More »

OVERCOMING INTELLECTUALISM ABOUT UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE: A UNIFIED APPROACH (pages 7-26)

Eros M. de CARVALHO ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent’s contribution in bringing about an achievement ... Read More »

THE EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FORCED CHOICE (pages 365-374)

Mark SCHROEDER ABSTRACT: In “Stakes, Withholding, and Pragmatic Encroachment on Knowledge,” I used a variety of cases, including cases of forced choice, to illustrate my explanation of how and why some pragmatic factors, but not others, can affect whether an agent knows. In his recent contribution, Andy Mueller argues that cases of forced choice actually pose a dilemma for my ... Read More »

PRAGMATIC OR PASCALIAN ENCROACHMENT? A PROBLEM FOR SCHROEDER’S EXPLANATION OF PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (pages 235-241)

Andy MUELLER ABSTRACT: I argue against Schroeder’s explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 1, I introduce pragmatic encroachment and point out that an explanation of it should avoid Pascalian considerations. In section 2, summarize the key aspects of Schroeder’s explanation of pragmatic encroachment. In section 3, I argue that Schroeder’s explanation faces a dilemma: it either allows for ... Read More »

NON-PICKWICKIAN BELIEF AND ‘THE GETTIER PROBLEM’ (pages 47-69)

John BIRO ABSTRACT: That in Gettier’s alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier’s protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If ... Read More »

METHODS MATTER: BEATING THE BACKWARD CLOCK (pages 99-112)

Murray Clarke, Fred Adams, and John A. Barker ABSTRACT: In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further ... Read More »

KNOWLEDGE, ASSERTION AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY (pages 489-502)

J. Adam CARTER and Emma C. GORDON ABSTRACT: This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that ... Read More »

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