Tag Archives: knowledge

LUCK, KNOWLEDGE, AND EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY (pages 97-109)

Gregory STOUTENBURG ABSTRACT: Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his ... Read More »

UNSTABLE KNOWLEDGE, UNSTABLE BELIEF (pages 395-407)

Hans ROTT ABSTRACT: An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not ... Read More »

FACTIVITY AND EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY: A REPLY TO SANKEY (pages 443-444)

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the ... Read More »

WHY MUST JUSTIFICATION GUARANTEE TRUTH? REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 445-447)

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect ... Read More »

KNOWLEDGE DOESN’T REQUIRE EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 449-450)

James SIMPSON ABSTRACT: In a recent discussion note in this journal, Moti Mizrahi offers us the following argument for the conclusion that knowledge requires epistemic certainty: If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e. If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain. Therefore, if S knows ... Read More »

FACTIVITY OR GROUNDS? COMMENT ON MIZRAHI (pages 333-334)

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: This note is a comment on a recent paper in this journal by Moti Mizrahi. Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge requires epistemic certainty. But the argument that Mizrahi presents does not proceed from factivity to certainty. Instead, it proceeds from a premise about the relationship between grounds and knowledge to the conclusion ... Read More »

QUINE AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE INDISPENSABILITY ARGUMENT (pages 207-213)

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction¾when coupled with some other plausible and related views¾implies that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical theories within the Quinean framework.  This is a serious problem because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot ... Read More »

EVIDENTIALISM, KNOWLEDGE, AND EVIDENCE POSSESSION (pages 433-449)

Timothy PERRINE ABSTRACT: Evidentialism has shown itself to be an important research program in contemporary epistemology, with evidentialists giving theories of virtually every important topic in epistemology. Nevertheless, at the heart of evidentialism is a handful of concepts, namely evidence, evidence possession, and evidential fit. If evidentialists cannot give us a plausible account of these concepts, then their research program, ... Read More »

THE WARRANT ACCOUNT AND THE PROMINENCE OF ‘KNOW’ (pages 467-483)

Jacques-Henri VOLLET ABSTRACT:Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes ... Read More »

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