Tag Archives: knowledge

PRAGMATIC OR PASCALIAN ENCROACHMENT? A PROBLEM FOR SCHROEDER’S EXPLANATION OF PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (pages 235-241)

Andy MUELLER ABSTRACT: I argue against Schroeder’s explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 1, I introduce pragmatic encroachment and point out that an explanation of it should avoid Pascalian considerations. In section 2, summarize the key aspects of Schroeder’s explanation of pragmatic encroachment. In section 3, I argue that Schroeder’s explanation faces a dilemma: it either allows for ... Read More »

NON-PICKWICKIAN BELIEF AND ‘THE GETTIER PROBLEM’ (pages 47-69)

John BIRO ABSTRACT: That in Gettier’s alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier’s protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If ... Read More »

METHODS MATTER: BEATING THE BACKWARD CLOCK (pages 99-112)

Murray Clarke, Fred Adams, and John A. Barker ABSTRACT: In “Beat the (Backward) Clock,” we argued that John Williams and Neil Sinhababu’s Backward Clock Case fails to be a counterexample to Robert Nozick’s or Fred Dretske’s Theories of Knowledge. Williams’ reply to our paper, “There’s Nothing to Beat a Backward Clock: A Rejoinder to Adams, Barker and Clarke,” is a further ... Read More »

KNOWLEDGE, ASSERTION AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY (pages 489-502)

J. Adam CARTER and Emma C. GORDON ABSTRACT: This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that ... Read More »

BEAT THE (BACKWARD) CLOCK (pages 353-361)

Fred ADAMS, John A. BARKER, Murray CLARKE ABSTRACT: In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke.  In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are ... Read More »

REPLY TO ADAMS AND CLARKE (pages 221-225)

Tristan HAZE ABSTRACT: Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick’s method-relativized ... Read More »

SCHROEDER AND WHITING ON KNOWLEDGE AND DEFEAT (pages 231-238)

 Javier GONZÁLEZ DE PRADO SALAS ABSTRACT: Daniel Whiting has argued, in this journal, that Mark Schroeder’s analysis of knowledge in terms of subjectively and objectively sufficient reasons for belief makes wrong predictions in fake barn cases. Schroeder has replied that this problem may be avoided if one adopts a suitable account of perceptual reasons. I argue that Schroeder’s reply fails to ... Read More »

KNOWLEDGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING RIGHT (pages 265-289)

Davide FASSIO ABSTRACT: Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific circumstance depends on features of the subject’s practical situation that are unrelated to the truth of the subject’s belief, such as the costs for the subject of being wrong about whether the believed proposition is true. One of the best-known arguments used ... Read More »

TWO NEW COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE TRUTH-TRACKING THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 309-311)

Tristan HAZE ABSTRACT: I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan, and seem invulnerable to a ... Read More »

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