Volume XI, Issue 4, 2020

Volume XI, Issue 4, 2020

THE COLLAPSE ARGUMENT RECONSIDERED (pages 413-427)

Hamid ALAEINEJAD, Morteza HAJHOSSEINI ABSTRACT: According to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, classical logic, relevant logic, and intuitionistic logic are all correct. On this version of logical pluralism, logic is considered to be normative, in the sense that someone who accepts the truth of the premises of a valid argument, is bound to accept the conclusion. So-called collapse arguments are …

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INFERENTIAL INTERNALISM AND THE CAUSAL STATUS EFFECT (pages 429-445)

Nicholas DANNE ABSTRACT: To justify inductive inference and vanquish classical skepticisms about human memory, external world realism, etc., Richard Fumerton proposes his “inferential internalism,” an epistemology whereby humans ‘see’ by Russellian acquaintance Keynesian probable relations (PRs) between propositions. PRs are a priori necessary relations of logical probability, akin to but not reducible to logical entailments, such that perceiving a PR …

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THE PROBLEM WITH TRUSTING UNFAMILIAR FACULTIES: ACCESSIBILISM DEFENDED (pages 447-471)

Jonathan EGELAND ABSTRACT: According to accessibilism, there is an accessibility condition on justification. More specifically, accessibilism claims that facts about justification are a priori accessible—where a priori is used in the traditional sense that a condition is a priori just in case it doesn’t depend on any of the sense modalities. The most prominent argument for accessibilism draws on BonJour …

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A NON-PUZZLE ABOUT ASSERTION AND TRUTH (pages 475-479)

John TURRI ABSTRACT: It was recently argued that non-factive accounts of assertoric norms gain an advantage from “a puzzle about assertion and truth.” In this paper, I show that this is a puzzle in name only. The puzzle is based on allegedly inconsistent linguistic data that are not actually inconsistent. The demonstration’s key points are that something can be (a) …

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ORIGINAL FACTICITY AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 495-505)

Modesto GÓMEZ-ALONSO ABSTRACT: This article critically explores Nuno Venturinha’s project of capturing how we are situated in reality, a project grounded in the conviction that the closure of knowledge and the openness of experience are compatible. To this end, I will explore how an approach complementary to Venturinha’s method—one which regards the passive and the active in knowledge as rooted …

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ON CONTEXTS, HINGES, AND IMPOSSIBLE MISTAKES (pages 507-516)

Anna BONCOMPAGNI ABSTRACT: In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha’s Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha’s infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by …

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SOCIAL SITUATIONS AND WHICH DESCRIPTIONS: ON VENTURINHA’S DESCRIPTION OF SITUATIONS (pages 517-526)

Marcin LEWIŃSKI ABSTRACT: In this paper, I approach Venturinha’s ideas on contextual epistemology from the perspective of linguistic practices of argumentation. I point to the “thick” descriptions of social situations as a common context in which our epistemic language-games take place. In this way, I explore promising connections of Venturinha’s work to key concepts in recent speech act theory, social …

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