Tag Archives: doxastic voluntarism

Ioannis TELIOS ABSTRACT: Arguments against epistemic akrasia have been met with counterexamples from the higher-order evidence literature. Here, I present two counterarguments to address these challenges. Firstly, the attitude reclassification argument disentangles reason-responsiveness from the constraints of evidentialism and allows for the adoption of conflicting propositions by coherent doxastic attitudes. Secondly, the failure reclassification argument demystifies the loss of doxastic …

Brian HEDDEN ABSTRACT: I argue that an attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief – the pragmatic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among others – implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to …

Jon ALTSCHUL ABSTRACT: William Alston’s argument against epistemological deontologism rests upon two key premises: first, that we lack a suitable amount of voluntary control with respect to our beliefs, and, second, the principle that “ought” implies “can.” While several responses to Alston have concerned rejecting either of these two premises, I argue that even on the assumption that both premises are …