Volume XV, Issue 1, 2024

Volume XV, Issue 1, 2024

THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY OR DISAGREEMENT: RECENT FORMULATIONS AND SOLUTIONS (pages 7-23)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a …

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A PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOLUTION TO GETTIER’S PROBLEM (pages 25-31)

Mohsen HASANNEZHAD ABSTRACT: In “Is Justified True Belief, Knowledge?” Gettier shows us two counter examples of analyzing Knowledge, as “Justified True Belief” or “JTB”. Lots of scholars have reconstructed similar counter examples to JTB but we can see they follow a similar algorithm. Other scholars have tried to re-analyze knowledge by adding a fourth element to JTB and reformulating knowledge …

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ON DEFENCE OF KRIPKE: NECESSARY A POSTERIORI PROPOSITION (pages 33-38)

Seyyed Mohammad Ali HODJATI ABSTRACT: One of Kripke’s innovations concerning the philosophy of language is the doctrine that the truth of some metaphysically necessary propositions is only known a posteriori. The typical example he gives is the identity statement consists of two different proper names that refer to the same referent, like “Hesperus = Phosphorus”. By metaphysically necessary he means …

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PROVIDING STABILITY TO OUR WORLD. IDENTITY AND TRANSFERENCE: GEACH AND QUINE (pages 37-56)

Olga RAMÍREZ ABSTRACT: The problem of identity is central to epistemic transference. However, relative identity appears to be the only way to work out an epistemic useful notion of identity. Relative identity, on its part, is either parasitic on strict identity or not identity at all. If, on the contrary, we ought for a strict concept of identity capable of …

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AGAINST EPISTEMIC AKRASIA (pages 57-79)

Ioannis TELIOS ABSTRACT: Arguments against epistemic akrasia have been met with counterexamples from the higher-order evidence literature. Here, I present two counterarguments to address these challenges. Firstly, the attitude reclassification argument disentangles reason-responsiveness from the constraints of evidentialism and allows for the adoption of conflicting propositions by coherent doxastic attitudes. Secondly, the failure reclassification argument demystifies the loss of doxastic …

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IS A MORAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY LIMITED BY AGENTS’ LACK OF EPISTEMIC CONTROL? (pages 83-87)

Björn LUNDGREN ABSTRACT: In their Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that there is no moral right to privacy, which resulted in a string of papers. This paper addresses an argument in their most recent contribution, according to which there is no moral right to privacy because individuals cannot control their access to information. Here their …

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MANNE, MORAL GASLIGHTING, AND THE POLITICS OF METHODOLOGY (pages 89-94)

Paul-Mikhail CATAPANG PODOSKY ABSTRACT: Kate Manne claims that her account of gaslighting rectifies regrettable deficiencies in existing theories. However, Manne hasn’t done enough to demonstrate the novelty of her view given that she fails to seriously engage with a significant portion of the gaslighting literature. This is an issue in the politics of methodology. Many theorists working on gaslighting exist …

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