Tag Archives: epistemic value

ON SOME ARGUMENTS FOR EPISTEMIC VALUE PLURALISM (pages 77-96)

Timothy PERRINE ABSTRACT: Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing ... Read More »

EPISTEMIC UTILITY AND THE NORMATIVITY OF LOGIC (pages 455-492)

Richard PETTIGREW ABSTRACT: How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of ... Read More »

KNOWLEDGE, ASSERTION AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY (pages 489-502)

J. Adam CARTER and Emma C. GORDON ABSTRACT: This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that ... Read More »

Optimizare SEO Carucioare copii Carucioare 3 in 1