Volume VII, Issue 1, 2016

Volume VII, Issue 1, March, 2016

GAMES OF PARTIAL INFORMATION AND PREDICATES OF PERSONAL TASTE (pages 7-29)

Mihai HÎNCU ABSTRACT: A predicate of personal taste occurring in a sentence in which the perspectival information is not linguistically articulated by an experiencer phrase may have two different readings. In case the speaker of a bare sentence formed with a predicate of personal taste uses the subjective predicate encoding perspectival information in one way and the hearer interprets it in ... Read More »

BEING SURE AND BEING CONFIDENT THAT YOU WON’T LOSE CONFIDENCE (pages 45-54)

Alexander R. PRUSS ABSTRACT: There is an important sense in which one can be sure without being certain, i.e., without assigning unit probability. I will offer an explication of this sense of sureness, connecting it with the level of credence that a rational agent would need to have to be confident that she won’t ever lose her confidence. A simple formal ... Read More »

WHAT IF BIZET AND VERDI HAD BEEN COMPATRIOTS? (pages 55-66)

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in the principles that govern counterfactuals on the basis that intuitions support that principle. This is because there are pairs of competing counterfactuals that appear to be equally acceptable. In doing so, he was forced to introduced semantic vagueness into his system of counterfactuals. In this paper it ... Read More »

TWO NON-COUNTER EXAMPLES TO TRUTH-TRACKING THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 67-73)

Fred ADAMS, Murray CLARKE ABSTRACT: In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick’s Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick’s theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick’s theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we ... Read More »

A FAILED TWIST TO ANOLD PROBLEM:AREPLY TO JOHN N.WILLIAMS (pages 75-81)

Rodrigo BORGES ABSTRACT: John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of ... Read More »

STILL A NEW PROBLEM FOR DEFEASIBILITY: A REJOINDER TO BORGES (pages 83-94)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which ... Read More »

JUSTIFICATION AND THE UNIQUENESS THESIS AGAIN – A RESPONSE TO ANANTHARAMAN (pages 95-100)

Luis ROSA ABSTRACT: I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman’s points. Download PDF Read More »

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