Volume X, Issue 3, 2019

Volume X, Issue 3, 2019

INNER SPEECH AND METACOGNITION: A DEFENSE OF THE COMMITMENT-BASED APPROACH (pages 245-261)

Víctor Fernández CASTRO ABSTRACT: A widespread view in philosophy claims that inner speech is closely tied to human metacognitive capacities. This so-called format view of inner speech considers that talking to oneself allows humans to gain access to their own mental states by forming metarepresentation states through the rehearsal of inner utterances (section 2). The aim of this paper is ... Read More »

ACCURACY AND THE IMPS (pages 263-282)

James M. Joyce, Brian Weatherson ABSTRACT: Recently several authors have argued that accuracy-first epistemology ends up licensing problematic epistemic bribes. They charge that it is better, given the accuracy-first approach, to deliberately form one false belief if this will lead to forming many other true beliefs. We argue that this is not a consequence of the accuracy-first view. If one ... Read More »

WHAT IS THE EPISTEMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF DISAGREEMENT? (pages 283-298)

N. Gabriel Martin ABSTRACT: Over the past decade, attention to epistemically significant disagreement has centered on the question of whose disagreement qualifies as significant, but ignored another fundamental question: what is the epistemic significance of disagreement? While epistemologists have assumed that disagreement is only significant when it indicates a determinate likelihood that one’s own belief is false, and therefore that ... Read More »

BRIDGING THE INTELLECTUALIST DIVIDE: A READING OF STANLEY’S RYLE (pages 299-324)

Jesús NAVARRO ABSTRACT: Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and ... Read More »

REPLY TO FORRAI: NO REPRIEVE FOR GETTIER “BELIEFS” (pages 327-331)

John BIRO ABSTRACT: In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone’s reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as ... Read More »

FACTIVITY OR GROUNDS? COMMENT ON MIZRAHI (pages 333-334)

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: This note is a comment on a recent paper in this journal by Moti Mizrahi. Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge requires epistemic certainty. But the argument that Mizrahi presents does not proceed from factivity to certainty. Instead, it proceeds from a premise about the relationship between grounds and knowledge to the conclusion ... Read More »

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