Volume X, Issue 4, 2019

Volume X, Issue 4, December 2019

SKEPTICAL THEISM AND THE CREEP PROBLEM (pages 349-362)

Scott AIKIN, Brian RIBEIRO ABSTRACT: Skeptical theism is the view that human knowledge and understanding are severely limited, compared to that of the divine. The view is deployed as an undercutting defeater for evidential arguments from evil. However, skeptical theism has broader skeptical consequences than those for the argument from evil. The epistemic principles of this skeptical creep are identified ... Read More »

THE KNOBE EFFECT WITH PROBABLE OUTCOMES AND AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC TRIGGERS (pages 363-377)

Tommaso OSTILLIO, Michal BUKAT ABSTRACT: This paper contributes to the existing philosophical literature on the Knobe Effect (KE) in two main ways: first, this paper disconfirms the KE by showing that the latter does not hold in contexts with probable outcomes; second, this paper shows that KE is strongly sensitive to the availability heuristic bias. In particular, this paper presents ... Read More »

SURREALISM IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO SCIENTIFIC REALISM (pages 379-393)

Seungbae PARK ABSTRACT: Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is ... Read More »

UNSTABLE KNOWLEDGE, UNSTABLE BELIEF (pages 395-407)

Hans ROTT ABSTRACT: An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not ... Read More »

THE AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (pages 409-432)

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen’s infamous “best of a bad lot” objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response ... Read More »

THE PERMISSIBLE NORM OF TRUTH AND “OUGHT IMPLIES CAN” (pages 433-440)

Xintong WEI ABSTRACT: Many philosophers hold that a norm of truth governs the propositional attitude of belief. According to one popular construal of normativity, normativity is prescriptive in nature. The prescriptive norm can be formulated either in terms of obligation or permission: one ought to or may believe that p just in case p is true. It has been argued ... Read More »

FACTIVITY AND EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY: A REPLY TO SANKEY (pages 443-444)

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the ... Read More »

WHY MUST JUSTIFICATION GUARANTEE TRUTH? REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 445-447)

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect ... Read More »

KNOWLEDGE DOESN’T REQUIRE EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 449-450)

James SIMPSON ABSTRACT: In a recent discussion note in this journal, Moti Mizrahi offers us the following argument for the conclusion that knowledge requires epistemic certainty: If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e. If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain. Therefore, if S knows ... Read More »

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