Discussion Notes/Debate X, 4

Discussion Notes/Debate X, 4

FACTIVITY AND EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY: A REPLY TO SANKEY (pages 443-444)

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the …

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WHY MUST JUSTIFICATION GUARANTEE TRUTH? REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 445-447)

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect …

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KNOWLEDGE DOESN’T REQUIRE EPISTEMIC CERTAINTY: A REPLY TO MIZRAHI (pages 449-450)

James SIMPSON ABSTRACT: In a recent discussion note in this journal, Moti Mizrahi offers us the following argument for the conclusion that knowledge requires epistemic certainty: If S knows that p on the grounds that e, then p cannot be false given e. If p cannot be false given e, then e makes p epistemically certain. Therefore, if S knows …

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