Research Articles, XI, 1

Research Articles, XI, 1

UNIQUENESS AND LOGICAL DISAGREEMENT (pages 7-18)

Frederik J. ANDERSEN ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the uniqueness thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine ... Read More »

HARDER, BETTER, FASTER, STRONGER: EPISTEMIC STANDARDS AND MORAL BELIEFS (pages 29-51)

Nicole DULAR ABSTRACT: Much work in moral epistemology is devoted to explaining apparent asymmetries between moral and non-moral epistemology. These asymmetries include testimony, expertise, and disagreement. Surprisingly, these asymmetries have been addressed in isolation from each other, and the explanations offered have been piecemeal, rather than holistic. In this paper, I provide the only unified account on offer of these ... Read More »

STAKES-SHIFTING CASES RECONSIDERED—WHAT SHIFTS? EPISTEMIC STANDARDS OR POSITION? (pages 53-76)

Kok Yong LEE ABSTRACT: It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our ... Read More »

ON SOME ARGUMENTS FOR EPISTEMIC VALUE PLURALISM (pages 77-96)

Timothy PERRINE ABSTRACT: Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing ... Read More »

LUCK, KNOWLEDGE, AND EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY (pages 97-109)

Gregory STOUTENBURG ABSTRACT: Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his ... Read More »

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