John BIRO ABSTRACT: That in Gettier’s alleged counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge as justified true belief the belief condition is satisfied has rarely been questioned. Yet there is reason to doubt that a rational person would come to believe what Gettier’s protagonists are said to believe in the way they are said to have come to believe it. If …
Read More »KNOWLEDGE IS NOT BELIEF FOR SUFFICIENT (OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE) REASON (pages 237–243)
Daniel WHITING ABSTRACT: Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases. Download PDF
Read More »GRUEING GETTIER (pages 467-470)
Giovanni MION ABSTRACT: The paper aims to stress the structural similarities between Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ and Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge. Download PDF
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