Discussion Notes/Debate

ON INFERENTIALLY REMEMBERING THAT P (pages 225–230)

Andrew NAYLOR ABSTRACT: Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference …

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CARTESIANISM, NEO-REIDIANISM, AND THE A PRIORI: REPLY TO PUST (pages 231–235)

Gregory STOUTENBURG ABSTRACT: Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensory experience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same kind …

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KNOWLEDGE IS NOT BELIEF FOR SUFFICIENT (OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE) REASON (pages 237–243)

Daniel WHITING ABSTRACT: Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases. Download PDF

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