Discussion Notes/Debate, XIV, 2

Discussion Notes/Debate, XIV, 2

Self-Favoring Theories and the Bias Argument (pages 199-213)

Bálint BÉKEFI ABSTRACT: In a recent article, Bernáth and Tőzsér (2021) defend what they call the Bias Argument, a new skeptical argument from expert peer disagreement. They argue that the best contrastive causal explanation for disagreement among leading experts in philosophy is that they adopt their positions in a biased way. But if the leading experts are biased, non-experts either …

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Having a Hunch (pages 215-219)

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: It has recently been argued that when one conducts an inquiry into some question one ought to suspend belief with respect to that question. But what about hunches? In this short note, a hunch about the cause of a phenomenon is described. The hunch plays a role in the inquiry into the cause of the phenomenon. It …

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