Daniel RÖNNEDAL

Ought we to believe the truth and nothing but the truth? Two arguments for the wide scope version of the truth norm (pages 179-195)

Daniel RÖNNEDAL ABSTRACT: According to the so-called truth norm, we ought to believe that A if and only if A is true. There are many possible interpretations of this norm. What does ‘ought’ in this norm mean? Does ‘ought’ have a wide or a narrow scope, etc.? In this paper, I will investigate one version of this norm and I …

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THE APORIA OF OMNISCIENCE (pages 209-227)

Daniel RÖNNEDAL ABSTRACT: This paper introduces a new aporia, the aporia of omniscience. The puzzle consists of three propositions: (1) It is possible that there is someone who is necessarily omniscient and infallible, (2) It is necessary that all beliefs are historically settled, and (3) It is possible that the future is open. Every sentence in this set is intuitively …

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