Objecting to the ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ Theory of Knowledge: A Reply to Feit and Cullison(pages 407-415)


ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explain Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison’s two proposed theories of knowledge, their initial No Essential Falsehood-Justifying Grounds account and their ultimate ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ account. I then offer original counterexamples against both of these theories. In the process of doing so, I both explain Feit and Cullison’s motivation for jointly offering their theories and recount counterexamples that others have offered against various theories that assert that knowledge is justified, true belief plus some condition concerning essential reliance.

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