Volume XVII, Issue 2, 2026

Wai Lok CHEUNG ABSTRACT: Lewis’ contextualism entails that when there are too many epistemic possibilities in an epistemic context, epistemic infallibility is incompatible with knowledge given a residue of such alternatives not ruled out by evidence. I restrict certainty with epistemic context through epistemic relevance. Epistemically irrelevant alternatives do not belong to the epistemic context, while certainty of the fact …

Oliver KLETZ ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to articulate an individual’s general capacity towards emotions with virtue epistemology. Using the contrasting frameworks of virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, emotionality can be articulated, in different senses, as a faculty or a trait virtue, and assessed according to pre-existing criteria for making this distinction. Additionally, emotionality can be articulated within the context of …

Arturs LOGINS ABSTRACT: According to evidentialism, only evidential or truth-conducive reasons matter for the rationality of belief. According to pragmatism, pragmatic reasons can contribute to making a belief rational. The debate between evidentialism and pragmatism appears to have reached a stalemate. In this paper, we revisit the debate by focusing on the question and inquiry-sensitive view of belief and the …

Tiegue VIEIRA RODRIGUES, Alexandre ZIANI DE BORBA ABSTRACT: It is often said that truth is the fundamental value of epistemic norms. Values such as rationality and evidence are valuable insofar as they help to avoid false beliefs and achieve true ones. This view is generally called veritism. However, in a recent work, Catherine Elgin (2017) argued that veritism cannot account …

Johnny SAKR ABSTRACT: This paper advances a conditional rationalist argument against the metaphysical possibility of backward time travel. It proceeds from the assumption, accepted by some but not all modal rationalists, that metaphysical possibility is constrained by intelligibility, where intelligibility requires non-circular explanation and justification. Under this assumption, worlds that violate either the Strong Principle of Sufficient Reason (Strong-PSR) or …

Brian WEATHERSON ABSTRACT: This paper contributes to the project of articulating and defending the supra-Bayesian approach to judgment aggregation. I discuss three cases where a person is disposed to defer to two different experts, and ask how they should respond when they learn about the opinion of each. The guiding principles are that this learning should go by conditionalisation, and …

Alice WHEATLEY ABSTRACT: We do not just want to know the truth. We also want to make sense of things, such that we understand. In this paper, I argue that understanding is distinctively valuable because it involves attending to what matters; more specifically, we cannot improve understanding by obscuring what matters. Section 1 introduces some cases that suggest understanding involves …