Logos and episteme
Tiegue VIEIRA RODRIGUES, Alexandre ZIANI DE BORBA
ABSTRACT: It is often said that truth is the fundamental value of epistemic norms. Values such as rationality and evidence are valuable insofar as they help to avoid false beliefs and achieve true ones. This view is generally called veritism. However, in a recent work, Catherine Elgin (2017) argued that veritism cannot account of the epistemic status of science, since science accepts models and idealizations that are known to be false. Elgin’s argument can be reconstructed in the form of an inconsistent triad, from which she concludes that veritism’s central prohibition on accepting falsehoods must be rejected. This article offers an alternative defense of veritism. First, we re-evaluate the role of falsehoods in epistemology, drawing on the current debate about Knowledge from Falsehood (KFF) to show that the absolute prohibition criticized by Elgin is already under pressure, but for reasons more complex than they appear at first glance. Next, we argue that Elgin’s conclusion against veritism is premature. Using precisely the distinction Elgin makes between the attitudes of acceptance and belief, we show that a correctly specified veritism, whose central norm regulates belief exclusively, is not threatened. Finally, we go beyond a purely defensive stance and argue that this framework provides the resources for a robust veritistic account of understanding, thus meeting Elgin’s deeper challenge.
