Tag Archives: knowledge

CONSISTENCY AND SHIFTS IN GETTIER CASES (pages 331-343)

Andreas STEPHENS ABSTRACT: Two Gettier cases are described in detail and it is shown how they unfold in terms of reflective and reflexive desiderata. It is argued that the Gettier problem does not pose a problem for conceptions of knowledge as long as we are consistent in how we understand justification and knowledge. It is only by reading the cases …

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WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN SEMANTIC AND SUBSTANTIVE EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM? (pages 345-366)

Ron WILBURN ABSTRACT: Epistemic Contextualism is generally treated as a semantic thesis that may or may not have epistemological consequences. It is sometimes taken to concern only knowledge claims (as the assertion that the word “know” means different things in different contexts of use). Still, at other times it is taken to regard the knowledge relation itself (as the assertion …

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LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM (pages 53-76)

Ron WILBURN ABSTRACT: Epistemic contextualism (EC) is the thesis that the standards that must be met by a knowledge claimant vary with (especially conversational) contexts of utterance. Thus construed, EC may concern only knowledge claims (“Semantic EC”), or else the knowledge relation itself (“Substantive EC”). Herein, my concern is with “Substantive EC.” Let’s call the claim that the sorts of …

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EMPATHY AS A TOOL FOR LEARNING ABOUT EVALUATIVE FEATURES OF OBJECTS (pages 355-367)

Diana SOFRONIEVA ABSTRACT: It is generally agreed that empathy can give us knowledge about others. However, the potential use of empathy as a tool to learn about features of objects in the world more generally, as opposed to learning only about others’ internal states, has not been discussed in the literature. In this paper I make the claim that empathy …

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SCEPTICISM WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE-ATTRIBUTIONS (pages 133-148)

Aaran BURNS ABSTRACT: The sceptic says things like “nobody knows anything at all,” “nobody knows that they have hands,” and “nobody knows that the table exists when they aren’t looking at it.” According to many recent anti-sceptics, the sceptic means to deny ordinary knowledge attributions. Understood this way, the sceptic is open to the charge, made often by Contextualists and …

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KNOWLEDGE, CERTAINTY, AND FACTIVITY: A POSSIBLE RAPPROCHEMENT

Jeffrey HOOPS ABSTRACT: In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between …

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LUCK, KNOWLEDGE, AND EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY (pages 97-109)

Gregory STOUTENBURG ABSTRACT: Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his …

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UNSTABLE KNOWLEDGE, UNSTABLE BELIEF (pages 395-407)

Hans ROTT ABSTRACT: An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not …

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