Tag Archives: knowledge

CONTEXTUAL SHIFTS AND GRADABLE KNOWLEDGE (pages 323-337)

Andreas STEPHENS ABSTRACT: Epistemological contextualism states that propositions about knowledge, expressed in sentences like “S knows that P,” are context-sensitive. Schaffer (2005) examines whether one of Lewis’ (1996), Cohen’s (1988) and DeRose’s (1995) influential contextualist accounts is preferable to the others. According to Schaffer, Lewis’ theory of relevant alternatives succeeds as a linguistic basis for contextualism and as an explanation …

Read More »

Objecting to the ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ Theory of Knowledge: A Reply to Feit and Cullison(pages 407-415)

Timothy KIRSCHENHEITER ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explain Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison’s two proposed theories of knowledge, their initial No Essential Falsehood-Justifying Grounds account and their ultimate ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ account. I then offer original counterexamples against both of these theories. In the process of doing so, I both explain Feit and Cullison’s motivation for …

Read More »

Education and Knowledge (pages 245-263)

Elliott R. CROZAT ABSTRACT: In this paper, I challenge a traditional assumption concerning the nature and aims of education. According to epistemic infallibilism, propositional knowledge requires epistemic certainty. Though some philosophers accept infallibilism, others consider it implausible because it does not recognize ordinary cases of supposed knowledge. On this objection, we possess many items of propositional knowledge, notwithstanding the fallibleness …

Read More »

Further Reflections on Quasi-factivism: A Reply to Baumann (pages 207-215)

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper is a constructive response to Peter Baumann’s comments concerning the argument from inconsistency and explosion that was originally introduced in “Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?” Specifically, this paper deals with Baumann’s two suggestions for how quasi-factivists might avoid this argument and it shows that they are both problematic. As such, his paper extends and …

Read More »

TRUE KNOWLEDGE (pages 455-461)

Peter BAUMANN ABSTRACT: That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. …

Read More »

CONSISTENCY AND SHIFTS IN GETTIER CASES (pages 331-343)

Andreas STEPHENS ABSTRACT: Two Gettier cases are described in detail and it is shown how they unfold in terms of reflective and reflexive desiderata. It is argued that the Gettier problem does not pose a problem for conceptions of knowledge as long as we are consistent in how we understand justification and knowledge. It is only by reading the cases …

Read More »

WHAT IS THE RELATION BETWEEN SEMANTIC AND SUBSTANTIVE EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM? (pages 345-366)

Ron WILBURN ABSTRACT: Epistemic Contextualism is generally treated as a semantic thesis that may or may not have epistemological consequences. It is sometimes taken to concern only knowledge claims (as the assertion that the word “know” means different things in different contexts of use). Still, at other times it is taken to regard the knowledge relation itself (as the assertion …

Read More »

LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE AND SUBSTANTIVE EPISTEMIC CONTEXTUALISM (pages 53-76)

Ron WILBURN ABSTRACT: Epistemic contextualism (EC) is the thesis that the standards that must be met by a knowledge claimant vary with (especially conversational) contexts of utterance. Thus construed, EC may concern only knowledge claims (“Semantic EC”), or else the knowledge relation itself (“Substantive EC”). Herein, my concern is with “Substantive EC.” Let’s call the claim that the sorts of …

Read More »