Logos and episteme
Wai Lok CHEUNG
ABSTRACT: Lewis’ contextualism entails that when there are too many epistemic possibilities in an epistemic context, epistemic infallibility is incompatible with knowledge given a residue of such alternatives not ruled out by evidence. I restrict certainty with epistemic context through epistemic relevance. Epistemically irrelevant alternatives do not belong to the epistemic context, while certainty of the fact is achieved when all epistemically relevant alternatives ruled out by evidence. Circularly, epistemic relevance is constituted by difference making to epistemic justifiability, such that something is epistemically relevant to an epistemic decision to believe if and only if it made an epistemic justificatory difference to the belief’s constitution of knowledge. I use the zoo case to illustrate the relevant alternative theory, with Williamson’s conception of evidence in explaining cases of knowledge when threatened by radical scepticism. Alternativity is understood with informativeness from Stalnaker, which is illustrated with whether the listener came to know.
