Logos and episteme
James SIMPSON ABSTRACT: Gualtiero Piccinini has recently proposed an interesting new solution to the Gettier Problem: Knowledge is factually grounded belief. But there is a problem with this purported solution: It is both too strong and too weak. In this paper, I provide two counterexamples to substantiate the claim that it is both too strong and too weak. Thus, the …
Read More »Tag Archives: Gettier problem
IS JTB KNOWLEDGE HOPELESS? (pages 261-270)
Arnold CUSMARIU ABSTRACT: An argument structure that covers both cases Gettier described in his 1963 paper reinforces the conclusion of my 2012 Logos & Episteme article that the justified true belief (JTB) conception of knowledge is inconsistent. The stronger argument makes possible identification of fundamental flaws in the standard approach of adding a fourth condition to JTB, so that a …
Read More »Objecting to the ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ Theory of Knowledge: A Reply to Feit and Cullison(pages 407-415)
Timothy KIRSCHENHEITER ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explain Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison’s two proposed theories of knowledge, their initial No Essential Falsehood-Justifying Grounds account and their ultimate ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ account. I then offer original counterexamples against both of these theories. In the process of doing so, I both explain Feit and Cullison’s motivation for …
Read More »IN DEFENSE OF THE KANTIAN ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE: REPLY TO WHITING (pages 371-382)
Mark SCHROEDER ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that …
Read More »IN DEFENSE OF THE KANTIAN ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE: REPLY TO WHITING (pages 371-382)
Mark SCHROEDER ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that …
Read More »HOW TO MOORE A GETTIER: NOTES ON THE DARK SIDE OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 133–140)
Rodrigo BORGES ABSTRACT: The Gettier Problem and Moore’s Paradox are related in a way that is unappreciated by philosophers. If one is in a Gettier situation, then one is also in a Moorean situation. The fact that S is in a Gettier situation (the fact that S is “Gettiered”), like the fact that S is in a Moorean situation (the fact …
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