Research Articles2

Research Articles, VII, 2

EXCUSING PROSPECTIVE AGENTS (pages 119-128)

Cameron BOULT ABSTRACT: Blameless norm violation in young children is an underexplored phenomenon in epistemology. An understanding of it is important for accounting for the full range of normative standings at issue in debates about epistemic norms, and the internalism-externalism debate generally. More specifically, it is important for proponents of factive epistemic norms. I examine this phenomenon and put forward a …

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TRACKING INFERENCES IS NOT ENOUGH: THE GIVEN AS TIE-BREAKER (pages 129-135)

Marc CHAMPAGNE ABSTRACT: Most inferentialists hope to bypass givenness by tracking the conditionals claimants are implicitly committed to. I argue that this approach is underdetermined because one can always construct parallel trees of conditionals. I illustrate this using the Müller-Lyer illusion and touching a table. In the former case, the lines are either even or uneven; in the latter case, a …

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IS THERE ROOM FOR JUSTIFIED BELIEFS WITHOUT EVIDENCE? A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF EPISTEMIC EVIDENTIALISM (pages 137-152)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be …

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EPISTEMIC RELATIVISM: INTER-CONTEXTUALITY IN THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION (pages 153-169)

Rodrigo LAERA ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a view on epistemic relativism that arises from the problem of the criterion, keeping in consideration that the assessment of criterion standards always occurs in a certain context. The main idea is that the epistemic value of the assertion “S knows that p” depends not only on the criterion adopted within an epistemic framework and …

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MODAL RATIONALISM AND THE OBJECTION FROM THE INSOLVABILITY OF MODAL DISAGREEMENT (pages 171-183)

Mihai RUSU ABSTRACT: The objection from the insolvability of principle-based modal disagreements appears to support the claim that there are no objective modal facts, or at the very least modal facts cannot be accounted for by modal rationalist theories. An idea that resurfaced fairly recently in the literature is that the use of ordinary empirical statements presupposes some prior grasp of …

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