Discussion Notes/Debate

Discussion Notes/Debate, VII, 1

TWO NON-COUNTER EXAMPLES TO TRUTH-TRACKING THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 67-73)

Fred ADAMS, Murray CLARKE ABSTRACT: In a recent paper, Tristan Haze offers two examples that, he claims, are counterexamples to Nozick’s Theory of Knowledge. Haze claims his examples work against Nozick’s theory understood as relativized to belief forming methods M. We believe that they fail to be counterexamples to Nozick’s theory. Since he aims the examples at tracking theories generally, we …

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A FAILED TWIST TO ANOLD PROBLEM:AREPLY TO JOHN N.WILLIAMS (pages 75-81)

Rodrigo BORGES ABSTRACT: John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of …

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STILL A NEW PROBLEM FOR DEFEASIBILITY: A REJOINDER TO BORGES (pages 83-94)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which …

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JUSTIFICATION AND THE UNIQUENESS THESIS AGAIN – A RESPONSE TO ANANTHARAMAN (pages 95-100)

Luis ROSA ABSTRACT: I reinforce my defense of permissivism about the rationality of doxastic attitudes on the face of a certain body of evidence against criticism published in this journal by Anantharaman. After making some conceptual clarifications, I manage to show that at least one of my original arguments pro-permissivism is left unscathed by Anantharaman’s points. Download PDF

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