Tag Archives: rational belief

RECONCILING EVIDENTIALISM AND PRAGMATISM: REASONS, BELIEFS, AND QUESTIONS (pages 171-191)

Arturs LOGINS ABSTRACT: According to evidentialism, only evidential or truth-conducive reasons matter for the rationality of belief. According to pragmatism, pragmatic reasons can contribute to making a belief rational. The debate between evidentialism and pragmatism appears to have reached a stalemate. In this paper, we revisit the debate by focusing on the question and inquiry-sensitive view of belief and the …

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UNSTABLE KNOWLEDGE, UNSTABLE BELIEF (pages 395-407)

Hans ROTT ABSTRACT: An idea going back to Plato’s Meno is that knowledge is stable. Recently, a seemingly stronger and more exciting thesis has been advanced, namely that rational belief is stable. I sketch two stability theories of knowledge and rational belief, and present an example intended to show that knowledge need not be stable and rational belief need not …

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