Tag Archives: metaphilosophy

THE END OF THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS? (pages 359-367)

Mark MALLER ABSTRACT: This reply is a refutation of Santiago Vrech’s article “The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments” (2022) which argues that thought experiments used in argumentation cannot hold in All Possible Worlds (APW) modality, and thus should end. Cases are used to justify or refute a philosophical theory, but should not have the power …

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IMPROVING CONCEPTUAL ENGINEERING BY DIFFERENTIATING THE FUNCTIONS OF CONCEPTS(pages 359-379)

Rogelio MIRANDA VILCHIS ABSTRACT: The leading assumption of this paper is that we can improve the methodology of conceptual engineering if we differentiate between the different functions of our concepts. There is a growing body of research that emphasizes the revisionist virtues of conceptual engineering against the descriptive task of conceptual analysis. Yet, it also has faced severe critiques. Among …

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The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments (pages 161-176)

Santiago A. VRECH ABSTRACT: In this paper I carry out two tasks. First, I account for one of the distinctive uses of thought experiments in philosophy, namely, the fact that just a thought experiment is sufficient to confute a well-established theory. Secondly, I present three arguments to defend the claim that, at least in philosophy, we should remove thought experiments …

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DOES METAPHILOSOPHICALLY PRAGMATIST ANTI-SKEPTICISM WORK? (pages 391-398)

Scott AIKIN ABSTRACT: Michael Hannon has recently given “a new apraxia” argument against skepticism. Hannon’s case is that skepticism depends on a theory of knowledge that makes the concept “useless and uninteresting.” Three arguments rebutting Hannon’s metaphilosophical pragmatism are given that show that the concept of knowledge that makes skepticism plausible is both interesting and useful. Download PDF

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