The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments (pages 161-176)

Santiago A. VRECH

ABSTRACT: In this paper I carry out two tasks. First, I account for one of the distinctive uses of thought experiments in philosophy, namely, the fact that just a thought experiment is sufficient to confute a well-established theory. Secondly, I present three arguments to defend the claim that, at least in philosophy, we should remove thought experiments from our metaphilosophical toolkit. The central premise that motivates these arguments is the following: the very methodology of thought experiments permits to construct different scenarios in which philosophical theories are refuted ad infinitum.

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