Research Articles, XV, 4

Marcoen J.T.F. CABBOLET ABSTRACT: The JTB definition of knowledge has been shown by Gettier to be incomplete: its three conditions are necessary for knowledge, but not sufficient. We argue that the JTB definition can be completed with a very simple fourth condition, namely that the justification for the belief in p must be sufficient to exclude ¬p. It is shown …

Wai Lok CHEUNG ABSTRACT: Stewart Cohen’s epistemic responsibility conception of epistemic justification in illustrating the problem of the new evil demon is assessed through some virtue-theoretic attempts, notably by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, whose accounts provide a good departure point to differentiate epistemic blamelessness through epistemic excusability via exercise of epistemic competence with epistemic recklessness. Some failure of epistemic …

Xuanzi FANG ABSTRACT: In recent philosophical exploration, a study delves into the essence of knowledge and intentional action, examining know-how and its connection to success. Carlotta Pavese’s “Know-How, Action, and Luck” (2018) reevaluates know-how, asserting its similarities with know-that. Pavese introduces a novel perspective by exploring the value of know-how and intentional action. Emphasizing the role of knowledge in explaining …

Virginia GRIGORIADOU and Frank COUTELIERIS ABSTRACT: In this paper, we discuss the existence of a specific criterion on which modern scientists and philosophers could focus to determine the basic categories of scientific models. We first examine why the categorization of scientific models is considered significant and why this type of research might be useful for modern philosophers. Moreover, we critically …

Benoit GUILIELMO ABSTRACT: Suspension of judgement is often viewed as a member of the doxastic club, alongside belief and disbelief. In this paper, I challenge the widespread view that suspension is a commitment-involving stance. Friedman’s counterexamples to the traditional view that suspended judgement merely requires considering a proposition and being in a state of non-belief are criticized. I introduce a …

Miguel LÓPEZ ASTORGA ABSTRACT: Lukowski argued that four typical examples of inferences used to show that human beings’ natural reasoning is nonmonotonic do not reveal that. Lukowski’s analyses support the idea that those inferences are actually monotonic deductions. My aim here is to check whether a particular non-axiomatic logic is consistent with the habitual conclusions people draw in those kinds …

Christopher NOONAN ABSTRACT: According to explanationism about epistemic defeat, our attitude towards the explanation of our belief in P can sometimes defeat our justification for holding that belief. In this paper I argue for the superiority of a particular version of explanationism which is considered and rejected by Korman and Locke (2023). According to this position our belief in P …