Volume XIV, Issue 1, March 2023

Volume XIV, Issue 1, March 2023

DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, AND EPISTEMIC DISENFRANCHISEMENT (pages 7-27)

Leandro De BRASI, Jack WARMAN ABSTRACT: In this paper, we explore some links between deliberative democracy, natural testimony, and epistemic injustice. We hope to highlight the exclusionary effects of some cases of testimony-related epistemic injustice within the deliberative democratic framework and, in particular, two subtle ways of epistemic injustice that are not often highlighted in the political domain. In other …

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LIE FOR THE OTHER: A SOCIO-ANALYTIC APPROACH TO TELLING LIES (pages 29-51)

Rauf ORAN ABSTRACT: It is a widely held view that lying is defined in the traditional tripartite model as the conjunction of a statement, the false belief, and the intended deception. Much of the criticisms have been levelled at the third condition—intended deception—with contemporary counterexamples. My main criticism of the traditional and contemporary model of lying centres on that philosophers …

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PREJUDICE, HARMING KNOWERS, AND TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE (pages 53-73)

Timothy PERRINE ABSTRACT: Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice discusses the idea of testimonial injustice, specifically, being harmed in one’s capacity as a knower. Fricker’s own theory of testimonial injustice emphasizes the role of prejudice. She argues that prejudice is necessary for testimonial injustice and that when hearers use a prejudice to give a deficit to the credibility of speakers hearers intrinsically harm …

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DISPOSITIONAL RELIABILISM AND ITS MERITS (pages 75-97)

Balder Edmund Ask ZAAR ABSTRACT: In this article I discuss two counterexamples (the New Evil Demon Problem and Norman’s Clairvoyance) to reliabilism and a potential solution: dispositional reliabilism. The latter is a recent addition to the many already-existing varieties of reliabilism and faces some serious problems of its own. I argue here that these problems are surmountable. The resulting central …

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NEUTRALIZATION, LEWIS’ DOCTORED CONDITIONAL, OR ANOTHER NOTE ON “A CONNEXIVE CONDITIONAL” (pages 101-118)

Eric RAIDL ABSTRACT: Günther recently suggested a ‘new’ conditional. This conditional is not new, as already remarked by Wansing and Omori. It is just David Lewis’ forgotten alternative ‘doctored’ conditional and part of a larger class termed neutral conditionals. In this paper, I answer some questions raised by Wansing and Omori, concerning the motivation, the logic, the connexive flavor and …

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