Volume V, Issue 1, 2014

Volume V, Issue 2, 2014

The Ultimate Secret Of Home Coffee Roaster

When selecting a roaster, some standards to think about are how much espresso you drink, your most popular roast stage, and how much you want to spend. Not all coffee roasters are designed the same. There are a large number of variations, sizes, design, price, form, and function. We met with Jay Endres, unique founding father of , a world …

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RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)

James FILLER ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new …

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EPISTEMIC INTERNALISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND MEMORY (pages 33–62)

B.J.C. Madison ABSTRACT: Epistemic internalism, by stressing the indispensability of the subject’s perspective, strikes many as plausible at first blush. However, many people have tended to reject the position because certain kinds of beliefs have been thought to pose special problems for epistemic internalism. For example, internalists tend to hold that so long as a justifier is available to the subject …

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CONSCIOUSNESS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH QUALIA (pages 63–91)

Frederic PETERS ABSTRACT: The equation of consciousness with qualia, of wakeful awareness with awareness-of-cognitive content (perceptions, conceptions, emotions), while intuitively attractive, and formally referenced as the primary index of consciousness by many philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, nevertheless has significant difficulties specifying precisely what it is that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious cognition. Moreover, there is a surprisingly robust congruence of evidence to …

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VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, TESTIMONY, AND TRUST (pages 95–102)

Benjamin W. McCRAW ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that Sknows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the …

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PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, JUSTIFICATION, AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 103–110)

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: In this paper, I argue that Phenomenal Conservatism (PC) is not superior to alternative theories of basic propositional justification insofar as those theories that reject PC are self-defeating. I show that self-defeat arguments similar to Michael Huemer’s Self-Defeat Argument for PC can be constructed for other theories of basic propositional justification as well. If this is correct, then …

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