Logos and episteme
Hassan AMIRIARA
ABSTRACT: Some philosophers have attempted to show that the thesis according to which the one-way velocity of light cannot be empirically determined (a thesis referred to in this paper as the IOV) opens a possibility for defending some A-theoretic ontologies of time in the context of relativistic physics, for, as they suggest, it can make a crucial contribution to developing an argument in favor of the definability of absolute simultaneity. Other authors, however, have taken the same thesis, i.e., the IOV, as pointing to the conclusion that some form of B-theory is the true metaphysical view of reality. In this paper, I first attempt to show how these two lines of reasoning can be traced back to two different assumptions regarding the IOV—construing this indeterminacy as either an epistemic or an ontic restriction—and I suggest that as long as each side takes one of these assumptions for granted, without providing further justification for their respective position, no decisive metaphysical conclusion can be reached. I then argue that a more promising avenue emerges when we consider a reverse line of reasoning. Rather than deducing a metaphysical view of time given a preferred assumption regarding the IOV, one can consider defending an assumption regarding the IOV given a preferred metaphysical view of time. This route can be expressed in terms of inference to the best explanation. Finally, I argue that the B-theory offers a better explanation of the IOV.
