Andrea R. ENGLISH ABSTRACT: My argument in this paper is that humility is implied in the concept of teaching, if teaching is construed in a strong sense. Teaching in a strong sense is a view of teaching as linked to students’ embodied experiences (including cognitive and moral-social dimensions), in particular students’ experiences of limitation, whereas a weak sense of teaching refers …
Read More »Tag Archives: virtue epistemology
A DISPOSITIONAL INTERNALIST EVIDENTIALIST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 399-424)
T. Ryan BYERLY ABSTRACT: This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidential support. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential …
Read More »AGAINST KORNBLITH AGAINST REFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (pages 351-360)
Timothy PERRINE ABSTRACT: In On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes Sosa’s distinction between animal and reflective knowledge. His two chief criticisms are that reflective knowledge is not superior to animal knowledge and that Sosa’s distinction does not identify two kinds of knowledge. I argue that Sosa can successfully avoid both of these charges. Download PDF
Read More »RECOVERING PLATO: A PLATONIC VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 7–31)
James FILLER ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new …
Read More »VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY, TESTIMONY, AND TRUST (pages 95–102)
Benjamin W. McCRAW ABSTRACT: In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that Sknows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the …
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