Tag Archives: truth-tracking

THE RESURRECTION SHUFFLE: TRACKING THEORIES AND BACKWARD CLOCKS (pages 207-222)

Murray CLARKE and Fred ADAMS ABSTRACT: Several years ago, John Williams posted his final response to Clarke, Adams and Barker in an ongoing debate about the status of Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking account of propositional knowledge and Fred Dretske’s early “Conclusive Reasons” account of knowledge. In this paper, we respond directly to his “Still Stuck on the Backward Clock” paper. We …

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BEAT THE (BACKWARD) CLOCK (pages 353-361)

Fred ADAMS, John A. BARKER, Murray CLARKE ABSTRACT: In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke.  In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are …

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THERE’S NOTHING TO BEAT A BACKWARD CLOCK: A REJOINDER TO ADAMS, BARKER AND CLARKE (pages 363-378)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. Fred Adams, John Barker and Murray Clarke argue that Backward Clock is no such counterexample. Their argument fails to nullify Backward Clock which also shows that other tracking analyses, such as Dretske’s and one that Adams et al. may …

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REPLY TO ADAMS AND CLARKE (pages 221-225)

Tristan HAZE ABSTRACT: Here I defend two counterexamples to Nozick’s truth-tracking theory of knowledge from an attack on them by Adams and Clarke. With respect to the first counterexample, Adams and Clarke make the error of judging that my belief counts as knowledge. More demonstrably, with respect to the second counterexample they make the error of thinking that, on Nozick’s method-relativized …

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TWO NEW COUNTEREXAMPLES TO THE TRUTH-TRACKING THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE (pages 309-311)

Tristan HAZE ABSTRACT: I present two counterexamples to the recently back-in-favour truth-tracking account of knowledge: one involving a true belief resting on a counterfactually robust delusion, one involving a true belief acquired alongside a bunch of false beliefs. These counterexamples carry over to a recent modification of the theory due to Rachael Briggs and Daniel Nolan, and seem invulnerable to a …

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