Tag Archives: self-knowledge

Seyyed Mohsen ESLAMI ABSTRACT: Reasons are not the same. Normative reasons need to be distinguished from non-normative reasons. Then, due to some considerations, we have to draw a distinction between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. In this paper, I focus on a rather implicit assumption in drawing the explanatory-motivating distinction. Motivating reasons are mostly characterized as those reasons that the …

Benjamin WINOKUR ABSTRACT: A growing cohort of philosophers argue that inference, understood as an agent-level psychological process or event, is subject to a “Taking Condition.” The Taking Condition states, roughly, that drawing an inference requires one to take one’s premise(s) to epistemically support one’s conclusion, where “takings” are some sort of higher-order attitude, thought, intuition, or act. My question is …

Simon DIERIG ABSTRACT: In this essay, Crispin Wright’s various attempts at solving the so-called McKinsey paradox are reconstructed and criticized. In the first section, I argue against Anthony Brueckner that Wright’s solution does require that there is a failure of warrant transmission in McKinsey’s argument. To this end, a variant of the McKinsey paradox for earned a priori warrant is …

Simon DIERIG ABSTRACT: Two major objections have been raised to Boghossian’s discrimination argument for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Proponents of the first objection claim that thoughts about “twin water” are not relevant alternatives to thoughts about water. Advocates of the second objection argue that the ability to rule out relevant alternatives is not required for knowledge. Even though it …

Peter BAUMANN ABSTRACT: Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore’s …